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goals of the arbitration system.
Corporations already are picking and
choosing which claims they want to litigate and
which they want to arbitrate, based on their
own view about when arbitration or litigation
provides them with the biggest advantage over
their potential adversaries. What corporations
do not want is a state court or legislature acting
to try to level the playing field by regulating
the way that companies can make those self
interest-maximizing choices.
Which brings me to my final point: that
corporate hostility to arbitration reveals how
the FAA’s preemptive reach has been inter
preted too broadly and that states should have
greater leeway to regulate arbitration to protect
the interests of their citizens.

As mentioned at the beginning of this
article, corporate interests have vigorously
fought against any state regulatory efforts as
representing “hostility” to arbitration that is
preempted by the FAA. Yet, corporate carveouts reflect the belief that arbitration can be an
inferior form of dispute resolution for certain
types of claims or when utilizing certain types
of procedures.
State efforts to regulate arbitration are no
different: They reflect a view that certain types
of claims are less well-suited for arbitration
than others, or that certain procedures in arbi
tration may make the process unfair or signifi
cantly disadvantageous for one party.
If corporations can write their arbitration
clauses to acknowledge the uncontroversial
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proposition that arbitration may sometimes
be a less-fair alternative to litigation, then state
courts and legislatures should also be allowed
to craft laws and doctrines that recognize this
reality.

***
Improving the legitimacy—and also the per
ceived legitimacy—of arbitration is important
for all parties involved. Failing to do so creates
the risk that Congress will enact legislation, as
has been proposed for many years, to dramati
cally alter the arbitral landscape. Taking note
of and responding to corporations’ own hostil
ity to arbitration is important for maintaining
arbitration’s reputation as a legitimate form of
dispute resolution into the future.

Commentary

Confessions and Redemption—and Politics—
For an Un-Neutral Person Who Mediates
BY MARJORIE CORMAN AARON

M

y color choices are bold over neu
tral. I am not known for taking
anything but strong positions on
politics, economics, education, ethics, aes
thetics, you name it. My political views
are now so strongly formed and
deeply felt that I avoid learning
political affiliations of mediation
parties or lawyers, or my students,
to preserve my ability to serve as a
neutral mediator or fair professor. I
hereby confess that I reject editorial col
umnists’ scolding to respect the other side in
political conversations, unless to gain insight
and strategic advantage for their eventual
persuasion.

My inner railings and outer rants about
what is wrong-headed, immoral, cruel, unjust,
ineffective, misdirected, and dishonest within
our current political and economic realities
prompt questions for me:
So, why am I a professional neu
tral? Why have I spent 30-plus years
as a mediator and occasional arbitra
tor? When I mediate, I lack ultimate
power to effectuate an outcome I
believe to be right. Even in arbitration,
I am constrained. I cannot jettison lawful
contracts, even if they seem usurious to me.
What are the consequences of putting one’s
professional energies into a profession that
aims at settlement, instead of advocacy?

The author is a Professor of Practice and Director, Center for Practice, at the University of Cincinnati College of
Law. She is the 2019 recipient of the law school’s Harold C. Schott Scholarship Award, which annually recognizes
outstanding research and scholarly achievement by a faculty member. Her latest book, “Risk & Rigor: A Lawyer’s
Guide to Decision Trees for Assessing Cases and Advising Clients—published by DRI Press and available on Amazon
(at https://amzn.to/2SNe5UF) and the Mitchell Hamline School of Law at (http://bit.ly/2riniTaLw9)—will be featured
soon in an Alternatives’ article by the author.This article is a follow-up to her September cover article, “Reflections
on Untethered Philosophy, Settlements, and Nondisclosure Agreements,” 38 Alternatives 117 (September 2020)
(available at https://bit.ly/32UOtIT).

Long ago, Prof. Owen Fiss decried ADR for
choosing settlement as its goal. I rejected Fiss’
Against Settlement (93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1983
1984) (available at https://bit.ly/2OCJupg)) at
the time. Recent ruminations cause me to
wonder whether I should regret that—even if
too late to undo.
Acknowledging the allure of a redemption
narrative, can I find one that is intellectually
honest? Can we mediators who are decidedly
un-neutral as to morality, politics, and justice
claim professional neutrality in ADR as a posi
tive force?
After a step back, and some reckoning with
the world as it is, not as Fiss believed it to be,
I’m relieved to report that my answer is yes.
Perhaps this relief is unfortunate, as it rests on
the reality of flawed justice and legal systems
that often make settlement or private process
the better alternatives.
As mediators and arbitrators, we can and
often do achieve good and right results, defined
as diminishing financial and emotional harm,
(continued on next page)
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(continued from previous page)
at least for an individual and sometimes for
many.
‘ROMANTICIZED UNREALITY’
Better decisions are based in reality, not roman
ticized unreality.
Some romanticizing helps us stay married.
If spousal realities are not recognizable in the
romantic illusion, however, the consequences
of staying will inevitably become real. Separa
tion is the wiser decision.
The parties’ decision to settle, or to medi
ate in hopes of settlement, may be seen as a
decision to separate from our formal legal
system. Even where settlements occur “in the
shadow of the law,” they are not bound by what
law or judicial process might impose.
Given the realities of the legal system’s
inevitable flaws and frequent failures to meet
parties’ needs, an ADR neutral’s or ADR pro
gram’s facilitation or encouragement of that
separation decision is a kind act.
Arguments against settlement of individ
ual cases, as articulated by Prof. Fiss, belie a
fantasy, a romantic view of the relationship
between justice, truth, law and our legal sys
tem. Fiss wrote that “settlement is a capitula
tion to the conditions of mass society and
should be neither encouraged nor praised.” Id.
at 1075.
He described claimants in media
tion as “plea bargaining” away their oppor
tunity for real justice. He characterized these
claimants as left with an unrequited yearning
for justice in the form of adjudication that
yields truth and legal vindication.
The real truth is that it’s naive to believe
that court judgments—judicial rulings and
jury verdicts—deliver pure justice under the
law, that their judgments are somehow true
or right.
Far too many years of elections, litigation,
mediation, classroom and CLE experiments,
and trial competitions, and far too much read
ing in news outlets and research literature on
decision-making, establish the folly of con
fidence in the “justice” or “rightness” of any
human judgment in any human system. Con
sider the following:

•

In every election, voters perceive and
evaluate candidates and issues differ
ently. A candidate seems inept and evil to
some, clever savior to others. It’s true that
the electorate need not measure a candi
date against legal standards; voters’ judg
ments may reflect different values, priori
ties or information sources. Still, elections
offer dramatic and consequential evidence
of human variation in observation, percep
tion, information processing, and critical
analysis.
Even decision makers viewing exactly the
same evidence, applying the same legal

Defending ADR
The neutral’s burden: Coming to
the mediation table with beliefs. And
biases.

The challenge: How the current
realities—’the way law and polity are
now’—affect settlement.

The conclusion: ‘[W]e need not
be neutral about the integrity and
humanity with which we conduct dis
pute resolution in our own spaces.’

•

standards reach different findings and de
cisions. Even when facts are undisputed,
they reach different conclusions. For ex
ample, a federal case may be tried in equity
to a judge and appealed to a circuit court
panel of three; two join in an opinion to
uphold, one dissents. Which decision is
justice? One hundred lawyers hear and de
cide the same simulated arbitration. Onethird of the group finds no liability and
awards $0; two-thirds finds liability and
awards damages ranging from $100,000
to $6 million. Which verdict represents
“justice”?
Do judges and juries “apply the law”
as it was intended? I ruminate over the
failed mediation of a business case involv
ing a plaintiff who, to my ears, had been
the victim of deceit and malfeasance. The
plaintiff later won the jury trial but lost

•

on appeal based on a legal argument I had
thought preposterous. The appellate judges
and I all went to law school: What result
was just? That same party then lost on her
adversary’s defamation suit, also based on
an argument I would have dismissed on
summary judgment. Was this justice too?
What if these rulings had gone the op
posite way?
And what of disputed facts? So often, in
cluding in cases with social and civil rights
implications, parties’ accounts of what hap
pened differ wildly. Each recounts vivid
perceptions and memories, convinced of
the other’s villainy.

Science tells us perception and memory are
subject to bias, distortion, and unconsciously
reconstructed narratives. “Justice” must choose
a side. So, what’s a jury or a judge to do?
They can only apply their own cognitive
filters, biases, perceptions of witnesses, docu
ments, and other evidence, and try to discern
a narrative of what happened. That’s all the
system can ask for.
The romantic sees justice as law applied
to truth, law as clear, and truth determinable.
To that vision, I say, look at the messy, human
world in which law and courts originate and
operate. In this world, no one should imagine
jurors’ or judges’ findings represent “the truth”
or its consequences “justice.”
Is it fair to ask litigants to go all the way
through the realities of a costly, slow, and
draining litigation process in our court sys
tem, where results are inevitably uncertain
and often unable to address their interests or
protect their legal rights? Will the parties really
be better off for enabling those judgments to
be rendered?
What Fiss calls “capitulation,” I would
call a practical and wise decision given those
realities.
A SEARCH FOR GRACE
In our rotting institutional landscape, there’s a
search for grace in ADR’s houses.
Drawn from philosophy and political the
ory, early and sweeping critiques of alterna
tive dispute resolution were premised on the
notion the law’s foundation is morally and
publicly derived, laudably expressing moral
and public values.
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A benefit of adjudicated outcomes would
be that they effectuate those laws within the
polity, and thus benefit the public—individu
ally and collectively. ADR’s settlements would
undermine the law’s foundation and diminish
the public’s benefit.
In these times, I regret to say that this
notion seems terribly quaint and regrettably
untrue. In the United States of 2020, the
deeply sunk pillars undergirding any roman
ticization of law and legal process have been
proven fictional or so rotted as to have dis
integrated. We have witnessed destruction of
faith in the power of legal, moral, and political
norms. Of course, the notion that democracy
“with liberty and justice for all” ever existed
derives from uninformed and naïve white
privilege.
Perhaps worse has been disintegration of
faith in law as public morality, as we have
watched lawmakers’ failure to correct executive
overreach and stark cruelty to individuals and
populations of vulnerable human beings.
We are now post-Mueller report, postobstruction of congressional subpoenas, postimpeachment “trial,” post-onslaught of heinous
laws criminalizing women’s choices and walk
ing the ramp toward a Supreme Court likely
to vacate precedent and validate these laws,
post- (and still) caging children and families,
post-cruelty to refugees, post-shame at denial
of all inconvenient truths—reality at the border,
of police brutality, racial oppression, poverty’s
trap, poisonous chemical pollutants, and the
earth’s march to inhabitable climate conditions.
Oh yes, and yet again, these times
include shameless and shameful lies to justify
Afghanistan and other endless wars, in which
no warmonger’s kin will suffer or die, only
distant poor, brown-skinned, or other “oth
ers” for the sake of distraction, capitalism, and
reinforcing the powerful. Distorted racist nar
ratives invoke national defense against refugees
and civil rights protesters and ignore the need
to defend our nation against radicalized home
grown militias.
Not morality, not humanity, not fealty
to political or legal process built on truth,
evidence, or just outcome: Only power is
accorded value. When political party and pres
idential obeisance seem paths to the font of
power, too many lawmakers abdicate respon
sibilities required by our political and legal
system.

They fail to honor law-made separation
between branches of government, fail to exer
cise oversight powers, fail to reject patently
false information, fail to seek or insist on truth,
fail to guard against corruption, fail to protect
the electoral process, and fail to protect it from
takeover by foreign agents.
ADR IN OUR
CURRENT STATE
It is against these realities—the way law and
polity are now—that we, as ADR neutrals and
advocates and parties and administrators face
the question of settlement in the current realm
of dispute resolution.
Here’s the question re-asked in light of
our current state: Are settlements achieved
through widespread and institutionalized sys
tems of dispute resolution better than the
alternative—a legal system without it? It would
appear that individuals and the collective often
gain more from the dispute resolution mecha
nisms than any abstract loss to the legal system.
What of the charge that ADR providers
and promoters of institutionalized ADR have
deepened power imbalances within our legal
system? Not guilty!
I raise the charge and the verdict here
because at its inception, the ADR movement
was charged just that. Experience suggests the
opposite is true: ADR systems may be credited
with modest leveling of power imbalances in
certain aspects of litigation.
Perhaps the more astute question is
whether, in the majority of cases, are court pro
ceedings—litigation and trial—better forums
for rebalancing power than ADR? Both fortu
nately and unfortunately, mostly not.
At the risk of stating the obvious: Unequal
resources cause power imbalances among
litigating parties. Cases end because parties
can’t pay to prosecute their claims. Wellresourced parties buy high-priced lawyers,
costly discovery, and motion-filled dockets.
Default judgments are entered against con
sumers, tenants or small business owners
who can’t afford counsel and aren’t aware of
legitimate defenses. Justice delayed is indeed
justice denied—and also tends to favor the
powerful.
When the wait for compensation for real
harms is long, people are forced into financial
duress. Is it fair or useful ask an individual
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plaintiff or a small company to bear the full
costs of discovery—for whom? For what? To
be squeezed so that they have even less power
to negotiate on the eve of trial?
Even with contingency fee counsel, a liti
gant who might have bargained for an early
fair settlement has far less bargaining power
two years later, when reduced to financial
desperation.
The same is true for the litigant who
accrues full legal fees for motions, discovery
and trial preparation before settlement is nego
tiated on the proverbial courthouse steps.
In light of these, the inability to tolerate
that risk further weakened the bargaining
position of the less wealthy and less powerful
party. Among the first systemic reforms pro
posed by the ADR “movement” was earlier
intervention to see if settlement was desirable
or possible. These took the form of institu
tionalized prompts for settlement discussions,
access to mediation programs and mediator
panels long before trial was contemplated.
Some court-related ADR programs were
targeted to early-stage litigation. It may have
been impolite to mention the conflict between
some lawyers’ desire to bill more and clients
desire to keep fees low.
Yet ADR practitioners knew it to be real.
We also knew of lawyers and parties who
might have welcomed earlier, more efficient
moves but worried about “signaling weakness.”
Institutionalized ADR prompts alleviated that
concern.
In some cases, the parties chose settle
ments that might not have been available with
out ADR. In many, settlements were reached
much earlier because of these ADR programs.
Thus, it seems clear that ADR served to reduce
power imbalances, at least to some degree, in
some cases.
ABOUT POWER IMBALANCE
Over the past 30-plus years, one arena in which
ADR has facilitated traditionally less power
ful groups to exercise real power has been in
class action or multi-district, multi-plaintiff
litigation.
One can look to the series of gender and
race discrimination class-action suits filed
against the big-name investment firms as well
as large consumer claims suits resolved in ADR
(continued on next page)
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processes. Drawing upon examples with which
I’m familiar, programmatic relief was written
into settlement documents, publicly filed, in
the Merrill Lynch and Wells Fargo gender and
race discrimination cases.
With the assistance of the finest ADR sys
tems design professionals and mediators, these
were fashioned and negotiated with plaintiff ’s
counsel, class representatives, and defense coun
sel. These actors were closely familiar with the
way certain employment practices and policies
facilitated discrimination as well as corporate
interests, operations, and constraints.
These settlements resulted in corporate,
class-wide, and individual redress and reform
measures that would not have been achiev
able otherwise. Without question, these pro
cesses shifted the traditional balance of power
between the parties in a positive way. Not
guilty, ADR!
I can’t resist noting that discussion of ADR
power imbalances ignores the larger realm
in which aggrieved parties decide whether to
raise claims, retain counsel, file suit, and settle
without any third-party neutral involvement.
An employee who needs her job may not
raise claims that the company is shorting her
commission payments. It should be common
knowledge by now that employees who complain
about racial or sexual harassment or discrimina
tion risk retaliation, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission notwithstanding. If
they can’t afford the risk, nothing happens.
An employee may not be able to afford
legal advice regarding his complaint, and so
may suffer injustice—unlawful injustice to. If
the employee does take the complaint to the
employer, with or without counsel, what realistic
chance does he have of negotiating a settlement?
Power imbalances are real. They occur
despite the law, outside of the formal legal
system, with no realistic path to legal redress.

Practice Skills
(continued from page 134)
Scenario No. 2, the Chinese company does
not want to purchase the required amounts of
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Within ADR’s house, and now in our arbi
tration and mediation rooms, we mediators,
court ADR administrators, process designers,
and arbitrators can construct and conduct
processes that reflect moral values our law
makers seem to have abandoned. I’m recall
ing mediations and arbitrations with parties
mystified or overwhelmed by costs, vagaries,
and the aggressive tenor of litigation. Or par
ties pinning all hopes and resources on victory
unlikely to be realized.
Sometimes, parties are trapped within con
structed narratives of demons and foul deeds
of former colleagues; they seek vindication and
restoration of pride. Too often, despite coun
sel’s best efforts, they are unable to see through
the legal thicket.
In employment discrimination cases, the
employer feels extorted, the employee suffers
financial and psychological loss or disorienta
tion. Plaintiffs want assurance that this won’t
happen again, that their claim will protect
others. On both sides, litigation’s complaints,
answers, counterclaims, document discovery
burdens, deposition cross examinations, can
bruise and burn.
Autonomy and control are surrendered to
judge, magistrate and/or the specter of a jury.
As arbitrators, we can fit the process
rules to the circumstances. We can exercise

discretion to streamline and reduce cost
burdens. We can run pre-hearing confer
ences in a respectful and even-handed man
ner, recognizing the challenges faced by the
parties and counsel. We can patiently allow
a pro se claimant to make a case and waive
strict technicalities. We can respectfully
hear what parties and counsel wish to say,
without cutting them off due to evidentiary
rules.
While required to make decisions consis
tent with operative law (in most instances),
arbitrators can make well-reasoned, accessible,
fair, and equitable rulings and awards.
As mediators, we can seek to create some
good within the mediation process. We listen,
we seek to understand and respect the parties,
lawyers, and their experience of the conflict.
We can gently explain negotiation and legal
realities the parties won’t or can’t hear from
their lawyers, while leaving choices in the par
ties’ hands.
Case law and statutes are what they are.
Mediators can offer or facilitate solutions that
address people’s business, professional or emo
tional needs and aspirations. We can lead peo
ple to find their way out of a litigated conflict
trap that saps resources, energy, and emotional
equilibrium.
We can conduct a process that enables
people—even executives are people—to reckon
with those they believe to have perpetrated or
suffered harm. We can aid them in restoring
some control over the destiny of their dispute,
and own the decision to settle or not, subject to
agreement by both sides.
Thankfully, within our tiny mediation and
arbitration rooms in ADR’s house, we can
choose to be strong advocates for respectful,
fair, and humane process.
The polity crumbles and my reality-based
despair at craven actors’ exercise of power
remains. Fortunately, we need not be neutral
about the integrity and humanity with which we
conduct dispute resolution in our own spaces.
No regrets.

natural gas because the pandemic has reduced
the demand for the product.
By contrast, in the third and fourth
scenarios, the nonperforming party seeks
to avoid liability based on circumstances
created by the pandemic that prevent

performance. In particular, in Scenario
No. 3, the reduced workforce caused by
widespread infection prevents the German
supplier from timely providing the required
services, while in Scenario No. 4, the gov
ernment order prevents the conference

Strong-arming by financial power, and dis
regard for legal standards, are much more likely
where grievances are stated privately, counsel
has not been retained, or even with counsel, suit
has not been filed. Greater financial resources or
higher social, political, or employment positions
translate to more power. It is both obvious and
unfortunate, but nevertheless true.
The universe outside of ADR is entirely at
the mercy of power imbalances. ADR does not
create these, nor can it erase them. We do the
best we can.
IN OUR
OWN ROOMS

